Multinationals and regional integration : a comparison of the Americans, Europeans and Japanese in the EC and NAFTA by MIT Japan Program. & Encarnation, Dennis J
THE
MIT JAPAN
i PROGRAM
Science, Technology,
Management
MULTINATIONALS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
A COMPARISON OF THE AMERICANS, EUROPEANS:
AND JAPANESE IN THE EC AND NAFTA*
Dennis J. Encarnation
MITJP 94-08
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
--- --------------· -- ---- - --  ---- I----
-) W' ·- 1
7 7·'3 L
4 )! Vlpj kw
1-
Q; --
Distributed Courtesy of the
MIT JAPAN PROGRAM
Science . Technology . Management
Rm. E38-7th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02139
Tel: (617) 253-2839
Fax: (617) 258-7432
E-mail: robart@mit.edu
@MIT Japan Program
MULTINATIONALS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
A COMPARISON OF THE AMERICANS, EUROPEANS
AND JAPANESE IN THE EC AND NAFTA*
Dennis J. Encarnation
MITJP 94-08
An earlier version of selected sections in this paper has been published in Multinationals in
North America, Lorraine Eden, ed., Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994
Not to be cited or quoted without the author's permission.
 _____ _II _____
-
About the MIT Japan Program
and its Working Paper Series
The MIT Japan Program was founded in 1981 to create a new generation
of technologically sophisticated "Japan-aware" scientists, engineers, and
managers in the United States. The Program's corporate sponsors, as well
as support from the government and from private foundations, have made
it the largest, most comprehensive, and most widely emulated center of
applied Japanese studies in the world.
The intellectual focus of the Program is to integrate the research
methodologies of the social sciences, the humanities, and technology to
approach issues confronting the United States and Japan in their relations
involving science and technology. The Program is uniquely positioned to
make use of MT's extensive network of Japan-related resources, which
include faculty, researchers, and library collections, as well as a Tokyo-
based office. Through its three core activities, namely, education,
research, and public awareness, the Program disseminates both to its
sponsors and to the interested public its expertise on Japanese science
and technology and on how that science and technology is managed.
The MIT Japan Program Working Paper Series provides an important
means to achieving these ends.
MULTINATIONALS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION:
A COMPARISON OF THE AMERICANS, EUROPEANS, AND JAPANESE
IN THE EC AND NAFTA*
Across North America and the European Community, multinational corporations
increasingly secure market access through foreign direct investment (FDI).1 That investment
grants multinationals sizeable influence over international trade--indeed, FDI may even lead
trade, as intracompany shipments link multinational parents with their majority-owned
subsidiaries abroad. These subsidiaries, moreover, actually record more foreign sales through
offshore production and overseas distribution directly in North America and the European
Community (EC) than is generated there through imports. When combined, such production and
distribution either supplies the local market expressly hosting that particular foreign
investment, or is exported both to nearby countries and back home. In each of these ways, this
paper will argue, the foreign investment and related trade strategies of multinational
corporations operating in North America and the EC have followed a common evolutionary path.2
Promoting that common evolution, regional integration joins a broad array of
interrelated factors that have long been recognized in the academic literature, and that will be
examined in greater detail below.3 Here, a market's sheer size and its location in the product
cycle are often cited. So, too, are a variety of industry characteristics, such as the pressures
exerted either by oligopolistic competitors or powerful buyers. Upstream, for example, these
competitors may exploit scale economies and other cost advantages that must be matched by
other contenders; while downstream buyers seeking greater service may, for instance, force the
creation of proprietary distribution systems and related marketing assets. Both tangible and
intangible, such assets may be so specific to a particular firm that their use incurs especially
high transaction costs that can best be overcome through intracompany transfers--as distinct
from more arm's-length exchanges among unaffiliated buyers and suppliers. Finally, in recent
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years, even government policies have encouraged a common evolution in North America and the
EC: Gone are the trade restrictions and capital controls imposed at various times by both host
and home governments; in their place are bilateral and multilateral agreements designed
expressly to accelerate foreign investment and international trade flows. When totalled, these
several interrelated, often competing, factors have managed to shape the foreign investment and
related trade strategies pursued by multinationals.
Understanding both the degree and source of variation in those multinational
strategies are the main subjects of this paper. My contention is that such variation, while still
apparent, has diminished considerably over time, between countries, within industries, and
among nationalities--all because multinationals have come to follow a common evolutionary
path. Along that path, multinationals have confronted numerous strategic tradeoffs, which have
been simplified and presented below as binary choices, beginning with decisions over equity
ownership.
Majority Subsidiaries vs. Minority Affiliates
Multinational corporations create and sustain competitive advantage through the
skillful management of tangible and intangible assets in product and process technologies, as
well as marketing skills and organizational structures.4 Such assets are specific to each
individual firm, and are often best exploited when that firm owns a majority (including all) of
the equity shareholdings in its foreign subsidiaries. Compared to minority shareholdings, a
majority position can grant the multinational parent a higher degree of managerial control over
the foreign use of that multinational's firm-specific assets. Such managerial control, in turn,
often helps to reduce the high costs that can plague more "arm's-length" transactions between
foreign suppliers of firm-specific assets and unaffiliated buyers overseas. 5 Instead of using
such arm's-length transactions, these foreign suppliers transfer their tangible and intangible
2
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assets internally--directly to their majority-owned subsidiaries abroad. Later, reverse
transfers also take place, as foreign subsidiaries begin to ship goods and services back to their
multinational parent, as well as to other related affiliates overseas. In the end, this circular
flow enhances the total pool of technological, marketing, and organizational assets available to
both the multinational parent and its majority subsidiaries.
At least since the Second World War, US-based multinationals have consistently
invested in majority-owned subsidiaries, rather than in minority-owned affiliates. Indeed, as
early as 1957, US multinationals reported to the US Commerce Department (in its first
postwar census of the foreign operations of US companies) that they owned upwards of three-
quarters of the equity invested in their subsidiaries abroad.6 For the Americans, this strong
preference for majority (including 100%) shareholdings remained phenomenally stable over
the next three decades,7 even as fresh outflows of US FDI reached their postwar high (during the
late 1960s and early 1970s) and then subsequently fell off, to be replaced by reinvested
earnings in existing subsidiaries.8 As a result of these investments, US multinationals
consistently reported that their majority-owned subsidiaries contributed an ever-larger share
of total foreign sales recorded abroad by all US multinationals operating abroad: reaching three-
quarters by 1966 (in the Commerce Department's first "benchmark" survey of US FDI9), and
climbing to four-fifths by 1990 (in the Department's most recent annual survey10). What
little remained was dispersed across equal-partnership joint ventures and minority US-owned
affiliates. Thus today, for American multinationals, majority ownership of foreign subsidiaries
remains a prominent characteristic of their foreign-investment strategies.
That ownership strategy has enjoyed its greatest success in other industrialized
countries. Specifically, in Canada and across EC member-states, majority US-owned
subsidiaries clearly prevail. In fact, within these countries, US multinationals continue to
boast that they own, on average, over four-fifths of the total shareholders' equity invested in all
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their foreign affiliates (see Table 1). Their shareholdings do, however, vary along the value-
added chain: Those subsidiaries engaged principally in overseas distribution, for example,
generally evidence a larger proportion of US shareholdings than do those subsidiaries engaged
principally in offshore manufacturing, which in turn evidence a larger proportion of US
shareholdings than do those subsidiaries directly tied to natural-resource extraction abroad. As
a result, in Canada, US oil companies report below-average shareholdings in their subsidiaries,
while US automakers and US retailers boast above-average shareholdings in their Canadian
subsidiaries. Such variation reflects, in part, differences in financial (and other operational)
risks, especially since average investments are typically lower in downstream retailing than,
say, in upstream oil refining, where greater risks may be shared with joint-venture partners.
- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE --
Such variation in US shareholdings also reflects wide differences in government
policies, which vary not only across industries and along the value-added chain, but also across
countries. Within North America, for example, just compare the incidence of majority US
shareholdings in Canada and Mexico. In marked contrast to US multinationals in Canada, those
same corporations in Mexico report that they own, on average, less than one-half of the total
shareholders' equity invested in all their foreign affiliates (see Table 1). Yet, despite such
obvious differences, in both Canada and Mexico we do find that the incidence of majority
shareholdings increases as we move down the value-added chain. Specifically, in Mexico, US
natural resource and (especially petro-) chemical companies have principally invested
upstream in minority-owned joint ventures, while US automakers have concentrated their
downstream investments in majority US-owned subsidiaries. In Mexico today (as in Canada not
too long ago), government policies have restricted foreign ownership in petroleum and other
4
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natural-resource based industries, while encouraging majority shareholdings in export-
oriented manufacturing.
When comparing Canada and Mexico, however, wide variation in majority US
shareholdings does not simply reflect obvious differences in national levels of economic
development. To the contrary, when measuring the incidence of majority US ownership, Japan
has far more in common with developing Mexico than with its G-7 partners. Indeed, in marked
contrast to either Canada or the EC, Japan continues to evidence the strong legacy of earlier
capital controls that limited both the value of FDI inflows and the level of foreign ownership.ll
Consequently, as recently as 1990, a decade after formal liberalization, those limited US
investments in majority US-owned subsidiaries still generated a small proportion ($62 billion
out of $103 billion) of the total sales recorded by all US multinationals in Japan--in fact, a
smaller proportion than that generated in Mexico by majority US subsidiaries there.1 2
Nevertheless, in industry after industry, the incidence of major US shareholdings in Japan has
risen dramatically since 1980, with the abolition of formal capital controls. As we shall see
below, this lower incidence of majority foreign subsidiaries in Japan (and in Mexico) has
worked to deny US multinationals the same market access that they enjoyed either in Canada or
the EC--or that foreign multinationals enjoyed in the United States.
Indeed, foreign ownership patterns in the United States look much like US
ownership patterns in either Canada or the EC, but not in Japan. As a result, Canadian,
European, and Japanese multinationals all evidence a high incidence of majority ownership in
their US subsidiaries. For the Europeans, at least, such a high incidence mirrors that recorded
by the Americans in Europe (see Table 1), with limited variation across industries. The
Canadians and Japanese, by contrast, seem more inclined to invest in minority foreign-owned
joint ventures, but the differences remain quite small. Few of these minority Canadian or
Japanese joint ventures can be found in the US distribution system, where their sizeable
5
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investments are actually concentrated in majority foreign-owned subsidiaries. Rather, most of
their minority joint ventures are principally engaged in US manufacturing, albeit in widely
different industries (for example, autos and electronics for the Japanese; food and metals for
the Canadians). Despite such variation, however, across these several industries majority
Canadian or Japanese ownership still prevails. Moreover, as we shall see below, the slightly
higher incidence of minority foreign-owned joint ventures by Canadian and Japanese
multinationals can be explained in part as mere "vintage effect:" While their earlier and
smaller investments across a broad range of industries were concentrated in minority joint
ventures, the recent and sizeable surge of Canadian and Japanese FDI into the US has largely
entered majority subsidiaries. With this surge, the ownership strategies of multinational
corporations of different national origins have begun to converge, as majority subsidiaries have
become the preferred means to gain and maintain market access.
Foreign Sales vs. International Trade
After securing majority ownership and managerial control, multinationals
typically employ their foreign subsidiaries to sell in overseas markets far more than they and
other exporters back home ship to these same markets. In general, foreign sales come from
three sources: the host-country market of the foreign subsidiary, the home-country market of
that subsidiary's parent, and third-country markets that are typically in close geographic
proximity to the host country. To supply these several markets, multinationals may decide to
invest in overseas distribution channels consisting of dedicated sales and service networks; or
they may decide to invest directly in offshore production. But before we examine (in later
sections of this paper) the actual sources and final destinations of foreign sales by multinational
subsidiaries, we will first compare the total value of those foreign sales (the numerator in
Table 2) to the total value of bilateral trade (the denominator). Such a comparison will
6
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establish the primacy of FDI as the principal means for gaining access both to downstream
markets for products and to upstream sources of supply.
For the Americans, the predominance of foreign sales over international trade is
not new, although some analysts have only recently discovered it. For example, Susan Strange
asserted that in the "evolution of international business ... the mid-1980s were a milestone as
the volume of international production for the first time exceeded the volume of international
trade" (emphasis added).13 To the contrary, at least for the Americans: As early as 1957, the
foreign (largely majority US-owned) subsidiaries of US multinationals reported total overseas
sales at twice the value of total US exports.14 A decade later, by 1966, the combined foreign
sales of these majority US subsidiaries had risen to represent three times the value of all US
exports.15 Subsequently, that 3:1 ratio of foreign sales to US exports has remained largely
unaltered. In fact, during 1990, US multinationals continued to sell just over three times as
much overseas through their majority subsidiaries than the United States exported to the
worldl6--further testimony to the fact that U.S. FDI continues to carry international
competition well beyond cross-border trade.
For the Americans, however, the relative mix of overseas sales generated either
by foreign investment or international trade varies widely across regions. On one extreme is
the EC, where majority U.S.-owned subsidiaries sold during 1990 well over six times more
than did all U.S.-based exporters (see Table 2)--a ratio that has remained quite stable over
time, dating back at least to the mid-1960s.17 By then, several factors combined to attract the
foreign investments of US multinationals to Europe: the growth in EC demand for sophisticated
products already available in the United States, the erection of common EC barriers to US
exports of these products, the reduction of comparable barriers to internal EC trade, and the
exertion of formidable pressures by both strong EC buyers and powerful EC competitors. These
pressures proved especially irresistible in oligopolistic industries where scale economies
7
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upstream and after-sales service downstream remain critical. In autos, for example, US
automakers and component suppliers during 1990 sold over 20 times more through majority
subsidiaries operating in the EC than they did through US exports to the EC.18 Here, as we shall
see below, regional integration has served as an important stimulus, encouraging the growth of
EC sales by US subsidiaries.
-- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE --
On the opposite extreme from Europe is Mexico, where U.S.-based exporters
during 1990 sold nearly twice as many goods and services as did majority US subsidiaries
operating there (see Table 2). Of course, compared to the EC, Mexico provides a much smaller
national market, where product cycles still evidence significant lags. Given these market
constraints, plus the strict implementation of capital controls, what little US FDI did enter
Mexico was limited in value and concentrated in minority joint ventures, all as a result of stiff
capital controls. Instead, US corporations principally supplied the Mexican market through
cross-border trade, which itself faced stiff import restrictions. However, the recent
liberalization of Mexico's trade and investment policies promises to reverse many of these
earlier patterns, especially for multinationals seeking lower labor costs. Illustrative of future
trends are US automakers and component manufacturers: During 1990, their majority
subsidiaries in Mexico sold over twice as much as they exported to Mexico.19 Such trends are
likely to continue as US FDI in Mexico continues to grow in response to NAFTA.
The recent strategy of US automakers in Mexico closely follows their long-
standing operations in Canada. Just as we saw in Mexico, US automakers and component
manufacturers in Canada reported during 1990 that their majority subsidiaries sold over twice
as much as they exported across the border.20 (In both countries, the largest category of US
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exports actually consisted of auto parts and components; and in both countries, these parts and
components accounted for roughly 10 percent of all US exports. 21) Yet in Canada, but not in
Mexico, that 2:1 ratio of subsidiaries' sales to US exports actually represented the average
across industries for all US corporations operating across different industries. For sure, this
figure remained well below the 6:1 ratio enjoyed by US subsidiaries in the EC (see Table 2).
Nevertheless, US corporations invested in Canada--as they had in the EC--to gain access to a
sophisticated (and long-protected) domestic market, where foreign investors often faced stiff
performance requirements in exchange for market access. But unlike the EC, Canada (along
with Mexico) offered geographic proximity to the United States to foreign investors eager to
reduce transport and transaction costs. The result, therefore, was a hybrid multinational
strategy that mixed large levels of foreign investment and related trade.
Like US corporations in Canada, Canadian corporations in the United States seem,
at first glance, to have also adopted a hybrid strategy that mixes trade and investment. By
1990, Canadian subsidiaries recorded US sales with one-and-a half times the value of Canadian
exports to the United States (see Table 2). But this Table is deceptive; for as we shall see
below, US subsidiaries in Canada contribute exceptionally high levels of Canadian exports to the
United States. These should be subtracted from Canada's total exports to the United States to get
a more accurate measure of the relative importance of FDI to (largely) Canadian-owned
corporations seeking access to the US market. Indeed, when this correction is made, we find that
Canadian subsidiaries in the United States sold two-and-a half times more than Canadian-owned
corporations exported to the United States. Moreover, regardless of the measure employed, we
can safely say that these ratios have increased significantly over the last two decades. For
example, figures for 1974 suggest that, by either of these measures, Canadian exports exceeded
the US sales of Canadian subsidiaries in the United States.22 But with the subsequent growth of
Canadian FDI in the United States, especially during the 1980s, US sales by Canadian-owned
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subsidiaries surely outstripped all Canadian exports to the United States--as Canadian
multinationals joined the same evolutionary path charter earlier by the Americans.
Further along that evolutionary path are the Europeans. But for them, too, such
progress is a recent phenomenon. By 1974, for example, European subsidiaries sold three
times more in the United States than did European-based exporters; this 3:1 ratio for the
Europeans fell far short of the 6:1 ratio of foreign sales to international trade enjoyed at that
time by the Americans in Europe. 23 However, over the next two decades, the Europeans erased
this difference, so that by 1990 EC subsidiaries in America actually reported US sales five to
six times larger than US imports from Europe (see Table 2). Thus, quite recently, the
Europeans in the United States and the Americans in the EC have achieved a rough parity in the
strategic mix of both foreign investment and international trade they employ to secure access to
each other's market.
Like American, European, and then Canadian multinationals before them,
Japanese corporations have also come to generate more of their overseas sales through foreign
investment rather than through international trade. But compared to any of these
multinationals, and especially to the Americans, this evolution is of very recent origin,
reflecting their prolonged status as traders rather than investors. In fact, as late as 1977,
Japanese subsidiaries reported total foreign sales to be roughly equivalent to Japanese exports
worldwide.24 But by 1990, following a decade of rapid growth in Japanese FDI abroad, Japanese
subsidiaries (most of which were majority Japanese-owned) reported foreign sales two-and-a-
half times larger than all Japanese exports worldwide. 25 This ratio proved even larger in both
the United States and the European Community, where during 1990 Japanese subsidiaries sold
four times more than did Japanese exporters (see Table 2). Thus, in both the US and the EC, the
Japanese have come to pursue the same foreign-investment strategies that have continued to
elude the Americans (and Europeans) in Japan--strategies which elsewhere in the world have
10
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proved so successful first for American, European, Canadian, and now Japanese multinationals.
Local vs. Export Markets
To generate foreign sales, multinational corporations principally focus on the
local market hosting their majority subsidiaries. No where is this more apparent than in the
United States, where Canadian, European, and Japanese multinationals all reported that the local
US market during 1990 consumed well over 85 percent of their subsidiaries' total US sales.26
Consequently, exports sales back home and to third countries have remained negligible.
Especially for the Canadians, neither a reduction in (transportation and transaction) costs
resulting from geographic proximity, nor related gains from the regional integration of
production and sales operations-none of these has exercised much influence on the final
destination of their subsidiaries' sales. As a result, exports back to Canada by Canadian
subsidiaries in the United States are still negligible. Similarly, European multinationals
exported an equally small proportion of their subsidiaries' US sales back to the EC. By
comparison, Japanese subsidiaries operating in the United States actually exported far more
back to their home market, but again these US exports (principally food and raw materials)
paled in comparison to local US sales. In short, the sheer size of the local US market continues
to exert a powerful influence on the investment strategies of major foreign investors in the
United States.
Of course, the relative importance of the local market may vary over time, as it
has for US multinationals. First measured in 1957, and continuing for at least another decade,
local markets in host countries accounted for three-quarters of all foreign sales generated
abroad by majority US subsidiaries.27 However, beginning in the late 1970s and continuing
through the 1980s, the contribution of host markets to the worldwide revenues of majority US
subsidiaries has gradually declined, so that by 1990 this contribution reached two-thirds of
11
total foreign sales.28 That 1990 contribution, moreover, varied little across host countries in
North America and Western Europe (see Table 3).
- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE --
What does vary for US multinationals is the actual destination of subsidiaries'
sales generated outside of the local host-country market. Again on one extreme is the EC, where
exports to third countries, mostly other EC member-states, contributed nearly 30 percent of
the total sales recorded by US subsidiaries (see Table 3). Worldwide, by comparison, American
subsidiaries sold just over 20 percent of total foreign sales in third-country markets. 29 What
remains of foreign sales, after subtracting those destined for host- and third-country markets,
are largely shipped back home. Over the postwar period, at least for the Americans, exports
back home have doubled their relative contribution to total sales by US subsidiaries, reaching
one-tenth of total foreign sales worldwide during 1990.30 Such increases result less from
large changes in the industrial composition of US FDI, and more from growing differences in
corporate strategy within the same industry and across different regions.31 Here, US
operations in Canada and Mexico both contrasted sharply with comparable operations in the EC.
In both countries, despite their obvious differences, majority US-owned subsidiaries generated
a large and comparable share--fully 25 percent--of their total sales by exporting goods and
services back to the United States. So, while the final destination of their subsidiaries' sales
may differ, North American trade by US multinationals closely parallels their intra-EC trade,
as they move to integrate their regional operations.
Leading the way in regional integration, both in North America and in Western
Europe, are US automakers pressured to realize scale economies in the management of cross-
border, multiplant operations (see Table 3). In both Canada and Mexico, as well as across the
12
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EC, the majority-owned subsidiaries of US automakers and related suppliers consistently rely
on export markets for more than one-half of their total sales; That export share is largest in
Canada, where Ford, GM, and Chrysler have tightly integrated their Canadian subsidiaries with
their parent operations just across the border in the United States. Here, US automakers have
been aided by bilateral treaties (most notably the 1965 Auto Pact), as well as a variety of US
and Canadian laws, all of which have eventually reduced trade barriers and encouraged foreign
investment. Many of these same US laws (e.g., 9801 and 980232), plus the recent expansion of
export processing zones south of the US border (continuing the Maquiladora program initiated
as far back as 1965) have also helped to make Mexico an attractive location for US automakers
and their suppliers looking to invest directly in inexpensive sources of supply. Finally, in the
EC, Ford and GM employ their production sites--principally in the UK, Germany, and Spain--
to supply the rest of the European market. (Japanese automakers, located principally in the
UK, evidence a similar EC pattern.33) Across the EC, as well as in Canada and Mexico, the
pressures of regional integration on US automakers greatly exceed the pull of national markets.
Offshore Production vs. Overseas Distribution
To generate their foreign sales, multinational corporations often invest in
majority-owned subsidiaries that produce offshore goods and services that are then supplied to
markets both abroad and back home. As a practical matter, pressures to increase such offshore
production greatly increase when any of several conditions arise: when national governments
severely constrain, or credibly threaten to limit, imports; 34 when global competitors derive
significant cost and related advantages from their overseas location;35 when indigenous buyers
in large markets demand closer relations with their foreign suppliers;36 and when foreign
exporters fear the increased risks of exchange-rate fluctuations.37 Otherwise, multinationals
will continue to supply offshore markets through international trade, at times supplemented by
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direct investments in overseas distribution. Such distribution is especially important in
industries requiring dedicated sales channels and after-sales service.
Quick to respond to the pressures for offshore production have been the
Americans: At least as early as 1957, and continuing for more than three decades, the value of
offshore production by US multinationals was twice the value of US manufactured exports.38
The Americans concentrated most of their foreign manufacturing in advanced markets,
especially in the European Community, where during 1990 majority US-owned manufacturing
subsidiaries generated sales nearly five times larger than US-based manufacturers exported to
the EC (see Table 4). To illustrate an extreme case, consider how US automakers and parts
suppliers generate their European sales: During 1990, US auto exports (including parts and
components) to the EC totaled roughly $2.5 billion.39 Compare this sum to the sales generated
both in local host markets ($36 billion, reported above in Table) and in nearby regional
markets ($28 billion) by the EC plants of US automakers. For US corporations, then, direct
investment in offshore production has become their principal strategy for gaining and
maintaining market access in the EC.
- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE --
By contrast, in Mexico, international trade still remains as important as
offshore production to US corporations. In fact, US subsidiaries manufacturing in Mexico
reported 1990 sales roughly equal to the value of all US manufactured exports to Mexico (see
Table 4). Such a ratio is actually quite common across developing economies,40 where few
incentives push multinationals to invest in offshore production. But in Mexico, recent
increases in US FDI have begun to reverse earlier trends. Again, consider the auto industry: By
1990, the total Mexican production (one-half for sale in the local market, one-half for sale in
14
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the US, according to Table 3 above) of US automakers was more than double the value of all US
auto exports to Mexico (principally parts and components for reexport). 41 As a result, US
automakers have come to account for fully one-third of the 1990 sales reported by all US
subsidiaries manufacturing in Mexico. With NAFTA such trends are likely to continue, even
with the simultaneous relaxation of Mexican import restrictions (on, say, fully made-up
autos), as Ford, GM, and other US manufacturers continue their pursuit of low cost production
sites.
By comparison, Canada lies between the extremes represented today by Mexico
and the EC. For in Canada, US subsidiaries engaged in offshore production reported 1990 sales
with a dollar value one-and-a-half times that of US manufactured exports to Canada (see Table
4). This ratio can be explained by looking at the Canadian plants operated by US automakers,
who account for fully one-third of the Canadian production undertaken by all US multinationals
(roughly the same share of combined sales also contributed by US auto plants in Mexico).
During 1990, US auto exports to Canada totalled roughly $17 billion,42 slightly above sales
generated in the Canadian market ($14 billion, reported above in Table 3) and exported to the
US market ($24 billion) by US automakers manufacturing in Canada. Such large sums reflect
the simple fact that US automakers on both sides of the US-Canada border have sought to exploit
scale economies as they manage their multiplant operations.
So large, in fact, is the Canadian production of US auto and component makers that
during 1990 it equalled roughly two-thirds of the combined sales of all Canadian multinationals
engaged in US manufacturing (compare Table 3 with Table 5). Indeed, the value of that US
production even fell below the total value of all Canadian exports of manufactured goods to the
United States. However, when we subtract from these Canadian exports those shipments to the
United States actually made by US-owned subsidiaries in Canada, a different conclusion emerges:
With this correction, the value of (truly) Canadian production in the United States is more than
15
one-and-a-half times larger than (largely) Canadian-owned manufacturers exported to the
United States (see Table 5). Of even greater importance is the fact that the US production of
Canadian multinationals grew during the 1980s at a rate at least twice that recorded by
Canadian manufactured exports to the United States.43 With such growth, Canadian
multinationals in the United States are following the same evolutionary path charted long ago by
the Americans in Canada.
- INSERT TABLE 5 HERE --
Quicker to follow that US path were the Europeans, whose movement is also of
recent origin. As early as 1974, the value of US production by European multinationals
roughly equalled US imports of European manufactured goods.44 Even when we add to this figure
the estimated value of additional assembly operations by European subsidiaries engaged
principally in US wholesaling, the total value of local production probably does exceed all US
imports from Europe. Still, such offshore manufacturing remained well below comparable
production by US multinationals in Europe. However, over the next two decades, the Europeans
moved to cut this difference in half, so that by 1990 their manufacturing subsidiaries in the
United States actually reported US sales nearly three times larger than US imports of European
manufactured goods (see Table 5). As a result, both American and European multinationals have
generally managed to produce and sell many more manufactured goods in each other's home
market than they and other national exporters shipped across the Atlantic.
From across the Pacific, however, the Japanese have continued to pursue a very
different offshore-manufacturing strategy, one that still lags Japanese exports of manufactured
goods. As recently as 1990, for example, foreign sales resulting from the offshore production
by Japanese subsidiaries in the US (or the EC45) were two-thirds the total value of Japanese
16
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manufactured exports to these markets (see Table 5). Even when we add to these local sales the
assembly operations of Japanese subsidiaries engaged principally in overseas distribution, the
total value of Japanese production in America and Europe still barely equals US (and
European4 6) imports of manufactured goods from Japan. For the Japanese, however, this low
ratio of foreign production to international trade actually represented a significant increase in
offshore manufacturing. Indeed, just over a decade earlier (in 1977), Japanese manufacturers
and (to a much lesser extent) Japanese trading companies had reported exports from home four
times larger than the worldwide production recorded by Japanese subsidiaries abroad. 47 Yet,
even after such growth, these Japanese subsidiaries had little in common either with US
multinationals in Europe or with EC multinationals in the United States.
Far more central to the foreign-investment strategies of Japanese multinationals
has been the establishment of majority-owned subsidiaries engaged in overseas distribution
(see Table 5). During 1990, for example, such intracompany shipments accounted for over
three-fifths all Japanese exports to the United States.48 Much of this trade consisted of autos,
nearly all of which was shipped intracompany, by Japanese automakers (with very little
involvement by Japanese trading companies) to their majority subsidiaries engaged in US
wholesaling. Here, the Japanese did not act alone. To the contrary, nearly all EC auto exports to
the United States are also shipped by EC automakers to their wholesaling subsidiaries in the
United States. 49 From this perspective, EC and Japanese automakers differ only in terms of the
value of total exports they ship to the United States. Otherwise, both have established dedicated
sales channels and after-sales service networks for shipments between their parents and their
US-based distributors.50
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In addition to downstream marketing of home-country exports, wholesaling
subsidiaries also increase foreign sales, by serving as upstream sources of overseas supplies.
Specifically, these subsidiaries often serve as purchasing agents, both for their parents back
home and for affiliated subsidiaries in third countries. Of particular significance to American
multinationals have been those US wholesaling subsidiaries which supply third-country
markets--especially those in Europe, where affiliated subsidiaries were among their major
buyers.51 Otherwise, for the Americans, wholesaling subsidiaries have proved to be of little
value as purchasing agents for shipments back home, supplying less than 2 percent of all US
imports during 1990.52 However, for the Japanese, wholesaling subsidiaries represent much
more important sources of shipments back home. These Japanese subsidiaries reported to MITI
during 1990 that they had supplied nearly one-half of all Japanese imports worldwide--and
the figure was higher still (roughly four-fifths) for Japanese imports from the United
States.5 3 These imports consisted largely of agricultural products, metals, and other raw
materials--all of which remained in short supply in Japan but were plentiful in America. So,
in marked contrast to the Americans, the Japanese (beginning with Japanese trading companies,
but increasingly including Japanese manufacturers) invested far more aggressively in
wholesaling subsidiaries in order to exploit the lower transaction and information costs they
enjoy back in Japan, where they tightly control their own proprietary distribution systems. 54
Intracompany Shipments vs. Arm's-Length Trade
Much of the trade conducted by multinational corporations is shipped
intracompany, among and between parents and their subsidiaries--a fact that has recently
attracted the renewed attention of academic scholars.55 For multinationals, such trade insures
greater control over both upstream supplies and downstream markets than do more arm's-
length transactions among unaffiliated buyers and suppliers. Intracompany trade also
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substantially lowers the high costs which these arm's-length transactions normally impose on
those cross-border exchanges of the technological, marketing; and organizational assets
necessary to compete successfully through foreign production and overseas distribution. As we
shall see below, only with majority ownership do multinationals exercise sufficient managerial
control to dictate their subsidiaries' decisions regarding these exchanges; such control is far
more circumscribed in minority affiliates. Empirically, intracompany trade seems especially
prominent in autos and other industries where significant economies can be achieved through
the integration and coordination of multiplant operations; or where additional advantages can be
gained through after-sales service.
Consider US-Canada trade. During 1990, nearly 100 percent of all US auto
exports to Canada were shipped by Chrysler, Ford, and GM directly to their majority-owned
subsidiaries across the border. Similarly, over 80 percent of all US auto imports from Canada
were shipped by these same US subsidiaries back to their US parents. This two-way auto trade
has important implications for total bilateral trade, since autos represent the largest single
class of goods traded between the US and Canada (accounting for over one-fifth of all US exports
to Canada, and over one-quarter of all US imports from Canada56). As a result, when totalled
across all industries, intracompany shipments between US parents and their Canadian
subsidiaries during 1990 contributed nearly 40 percent of all US trade--both imports and
exports--with Canada (see Table 6). By contrast, Canadian multinationals contributed little of
the remainder, given their more limited investments in the United States. Indeed, most US-
Canada trade not shipped intracompany by US multinationals was shipped at arm's length among
unaffiliated buyers and suppliers with no direct investments in either of the two countries.
Here, low transaction and transportation costs, both resulting from geographic proximity, plus
limited government impediments to market access, together aided cross-border trade
independent of foreign investment.
19
_1___
-- INSERT TABLE 6 HERE --
As in Canada, so too in Mexico, auto trade principally entails intracompany
shipments between the parent operations of the US Big-3 and their majority subsidiaries
across the border. Indeed, during 1990, such shipments accounted for nearly 100 percent of
all US auto exports to--and all US auto imports from--Mexico. But unlike US-Canada trade,
US commerce with Mexico is not nearly as dependent on autos (which, during 1990, accounted
for just over one-tenth of all two-way trade south of the border 57). Moreover, as we saw
above, Mexico--in sharp contrast to Canada--has attracted little US FDI in the face of stiff
capital controls, which then forced that limited investment into minority US-owned joint
ventures. Such minority ventures, as we shall see below, are typically poor markets for US
exports. Given these several factors, then, a much smaller proportion (roughly 25 percent) of
the two-way flow of US-Mexico trade is conducted intracompany. Instead, roughly 75 percent
of US-Mexico trade is shipped among unaffiliated buyers and suppliers with no direct
investments in either of the two countries (see Table 6). Yet, such arm's-length shipments are
likely to diminish in the future, at least as a proportion of total US-Mexico trade. Instead,
intracompany shipments are likely to grow in response to NAFTA: For as the dollar value of US
FDI in Mexico rises along with the incidence of majority US ownership, so too will the dollar
value of US-Mexico trade in fully made-up cars and other US goods previously restricted by
Mexican import barriers.
While US-Mexico trade continues to represent an extreme case of arm's-length
commerce, US-Japan trade illustrates the growing predominance of intracompany shipments.
Here, Japanese multinationals exercise unrivaled control over the two-way flow (see Table 6).
By 1990, in fact, over 60 percent of all US imports from Japan were shipped intracompany,
largely from the parents of Japanese multinationals to their (principally majority)
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subsidiaries in the United States. Here again, the auto trade figures prominently: Autos account
for over one-third of all US imports from Japan, most of which (over 80 percent) are shipped
by Japanese automakers directly to their US subsidiaries.58 In reverse, however, autos
contribute little to US exports to Japan. Yet, once more, intracompany trade predominates:
Shipments from Japanese subsidiaries in the US back to their Japanese parents account for
upwards of two-thirds of all US exports to Japan. Largely raw materials and agricultural
products, these US exports are then channeled by Japanese multinationals into their
proprietary distribution channels back home. There, Japanese trading companies and
manufacturers often enjoy lower information and transaction costs, as well as related
advantages, than do more arm's-length US exporters. For the Japanese, then, foreign direct
investment has created the orincipal channels for two-way trade flows with the United States.
By contrast, US multinationals exercise no appreciable influence over US
bilateral trade with Japan. Here, limited US FDI, and the concentration of that FDI in minority
foreign-owned affiliates serves as an especially high barrier in Japan to US exports. Indeed,
minority affiliates typically represent poor markets for national exports, even in those host
countries where affiliates' sales are relatively large. For example, during 1990, US exports to
minority US affiliates worldwide remained negligible--accounting for only 6 percent of all US
exports to US multinationals abroad--even though minority affiliates contributed just under
20 percent of all US multinational sales.59 More specifically, in Japan, US exports to minority
US affiliates during 1990 barely totalled $2.5 billion, much less than the $7 billion of US
exports shipped that same year to majority US subsidiaries in Japan.60 Yet, as noted above,
these majority subsidiaries accounted for barely $62 billion of sales in Japan, well below the
$103 billion in Japanese sales recorded by minority US affiliates. In short, because Japan has
long hosted a disproportionately large share of minority affiliates, and because these affiliates
generally refrain from purchasing US exports, US multinationals in Japan have contributed a
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relatively small share of this bilateral trade. By contrast, for the Japanese, the higher
incidence of majority subsidiaries in the United States actually has granted to Japanese exports
far greater access to the US market than the Americans, through their limited investments
concentrated in minority affiliates, have been able to secure in Japan.
In marked contrast to US-Japan trade, US-EC trade remains far more
symmetrical (see Table 6), as do US-EC investment flows. As a result of that investment, in
fact, intracompany trade contributed over one-half of all US imports from the EC. Here again,
auto figure prominently: Autos comprise the largest class of traded goods (accounting for 16
percent of US imports from the EC), of which nearly 90 percent are shipped intracompany, by
BMW and other EC automakers to their majority subsidiaries in the United States.61 Indeed, as
a general rule, the parents of EC multinationals are the largest suppliers of US imports from
Europe. Conversely, looking at US exports to the EC, the parents of US multinationals are the
largest contributors, often through intracompany shipments to their majority subsidiaries in
the EC. Here, US automakers are not active, since US auto exports remain small; indeed, in the
absence of much auto trade, intracompany shipments to the EC accounted for just one-third of
all US exports to the EC. Finally, what remains of US-EC trade is shipped at arm's-length,
between unaffiliated exporters and importers. Here again, foreign direct investment plays a
major role, with the US parents of American multinationals serving both as major exporters to
unaffiliated EC buyers, and as major importers from unaffiliated EC suppliers. This has left all
other US-owned enterprises to ship, again through arm's-length trade, roughly one-fifth of
America's exports to the EC, and roughly one-third of US imports from the EC. Thus, neither
American nor European multinationals singularly dominate bilateral US-EC trade.
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Implications for Government Policy
The corporate behavior analyzed in this paper has not only been shaped by public
policy, but ultimately has important implications for future government actions. This is
especially true as Canada, Mexico, and the United States together move to ratify and then
implement NAFTA. Yet, at the risk of oversimplification, NAFTA (as well as the earlier
bilateral accord between Canada and the United States) can be viewed as the formal codification
and timely acceleration of an ongoing process of regional integration already well underway
thanks to the foreign investment and related trade strategies of multinational corporations.
Thus, multinationals have led the way toward regional integration, and this fact alone has
important implications for government policy.
Beginning with Mexico, the recently accelerated liberalization of national
policies has already begun to accomplish many of the economic goals pursued by both Mexico and
the United States, goals otherwise embodied in NAFTA. Specifically, the eradication of most
foreign capital controls and the pursuit of export-oriented trade strategies have already done
much to attract increased levels of US FDI inflows and, correspondingly, to increase Mexico's
trade with the United States. Should such liberalization be reversed, however, Mexico's recent
gains could prove ephemeral. Indeed, prior to liberalization, the high incidence of minority
foreign-owned subsidiaries and the limited value of their FDI kept Mexico well outside of the
evolutionary path otherwise followed by multinationals elsewhere in North America or in
Western Europe. But with liberalization, that path now passes through Mexico, even in the
absence of a formalized NAFTA. Indeed, because of domestic policy changes, Mexico is already a
major beneficiary of regional integration, thanks in large part to the foreign investment and
related trade strategies of multinational corporations.
With more emphasis, the same may be said for Canada, where the regional
integration strategies of multinationals find their earliest origins (at least in North America),
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and where these strategies enjoy their greatest success. So great, in fact, that Canada now faces
ongoing asymmetries in trade and investment with the United States that are surprisingly akin
to the asymmetries encountered by the United States in its relations with Japan. In both
instances, multinationals from one country (US multinationals in Canada; Japanese
multinationals in the United States) account for most bilateral investment flows and control a
sizeable proportion of bilateral trade. While such asymmetries inevitably feed public fears,
they need not influence public policies, certainly not policies designed to redress asymmetries
through the imposition of trade and investment restrictions. Rather, one of the strong policy
implications flowing from this paper is that increased FDI outflows (from Canada to the US;
from the US to Japan) offer the prospect not only of increasing the foreign sales of
multinationals, but also of positively influencing national exports. This seems especially true,
for example, when those exports would benefit from proprietary sales channels and after-sales
service. In short, rather than view the outflow of Canadian FDI to the United States as an
indicator of national economic decline, as Canadian officials are known to do, an alternative
interpretation holds that FDI outflow can also be a maturing sign of national economic
resurgence.
The same can be said of US FDI outflows. But in the United States, FDI attracts
much less policy attention than does international trade. Witness President Clinton's recent
efforts to "talk down the dollar." Hardly a US investment strategy (since it increases the dollar
cost of foreign assets), the decline of the dollar is ostensibly focused on reversing US trade
deficits. Yet, these pages document the tight interrelationship between trade and investment:
For example, investment in offshore production creates new demands for US machinery exports;
similarly, investment in overseas distribution supplies after-sales service demanded by
foreign importers. In response, government policy should not be to manipulate the value of the
dollar upward, to reverse earlier trends. Rather, at a bare minimum, governments should
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elevate FDI to the same policy level afforded trade, so that the consequences of each on the other
can be better assessed.
What has attracted greater attention in the United States has been the sizeable and
sudden inflow of FDI into the country, especially during the 1980s. Here, the decline of the US
dollar can now be viewed as part of a national investment strategy, albeit one designed to entice
foreigners to buy lower-priced US assets. As in Canada, so too in the United States, these
inflows have fed public fears. But once again, they need not prompt public policies designed to
restrict trade and investment. For one of the major policy implications flowing from this paper
is that FDI inflows are positively associated with the creation and distribution of national wealth
--not just through increased investments in local production and distribution, but also through
the strong influence these foreign investments exert over international trade.
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TABLE 1
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP BY MULTINATIONALS INVESTING IN NORTH AMERICA AND
WESTERN EUROPE, LATE 1980'sa
US MULTINATIONALS (MNCs) ABROAD
Equity In Canada In the EC
$ value $68.7 $196.3b
of which:
% US 92.3% 86.6%
% Local 7.7% 13.4%
In Japan In Mexico
$35.6b $10.7b
36.5%
63.5%
48.6%
51.4%
FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS (MNCs) IN THE US
Canadian European Japs
Equity MNCs MNCsb M
Total $27.1b $76.5b $2
of which:
% Foreign
% Local
73.4%
26.6%
89.8%
10.2%
inese
!1.Ob
74.3%
25.7%
Notes:
aData on US MNCs for 1989; data on foreign MNCs in the US for 1987.
bData for European MNCs in the US available only for investors based in France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey. Final Results (Washington, DC: USGPO, October 1992),
Tables II.B.11 and III.B.11, pp. 56, 154; and Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:
1987 Benchmark Survey. Final Results (Washington, DC: USGPO, August 1990), Tables C-3,
C-4, C-5, C-7, and C-9, pp. 34-40.
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TABLE 2
THE RATIO OF FOREIGN SALES BY MULTINATIONAL SUBSIDIARIES TO US TRADE,
1990
THE RATIO OF US SUBSIDIARIES' SALES ABROAD TO US EXPORTS
Foreign Sales by
Majority US Ratio 
Location of Subsidiaries US Exports E
Subsidiaries (A
All Countries $1,191.8b $393.6b
of which:
The EC
Canada
Japan
Mexico
$615.2b
$177.2b
$62.1b
$19.3b
$98.1b
$83.7b
$48.6b
$28.3b
of Sales to
xports
(A/B)
3.03
6.27
2.12
1.28
0.68
THE RATI OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES' SALES IN THE US TO US IMPORTS
National Origin of
Subsidiaries:
All Countries
of which:
The EC
Canada
Canada (adjusted*)
Japan
US Sales by Foreign
Subsidiaries
$1,168.5b
$494.9b
$127.1b
$127.1b
$313.1b
US Imports
$495.3b
Ratio of Sales to
Imports
(A/B)
2.36
$91.9b
$91.4b
$51.4b
$89.7b
5.39
1.39
2.47
3.49
Notes:
*Adjusted to subtract from US imports from Canada shipments made by US subsidiaries in
Canada back to the United States.
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. arent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1990
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, September 1992), Table IlI.E.3, n.p.; and Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States: Operations of US Affiliates of Foreign Companies, Preliminary
1990 Estimates (Washington: USGPO, August 1992), Table E-4, n.p.; and International Trade
Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, US Foreign Trade Highlights: 1991
(Washington, DC: USGPO, May 1992), Table 2, p. 11.
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TABLE 3
THE DESTINATION OF SALES BY MAJORITY US SUBSIDIARIES
AND THE EC, 1990
IN CANADA, MEXICO,
ALL INDUSTRIES
Sales:
Total ($b)
of which. %:
Local
Back to the US
To 3rd Countries
Canada
$177.2b
73.2%
23.4%
3.4%
Mexico
$19.3b
69.6%
26.2%
4.2%
The EC
$615.2b
67.0%
3.6%
29.4%
AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY ONLY
Sales:
Total ($b)
of which, %:
Local
Back to the US
To 3rd Countries
Canada
$39.5b
36.5%
60.0%
3.5%
Mexico
$6.6b
50.0%
45.0%
5.0%
The EC
$66.0b
53.9%
3.5%
42.6%
Source: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1990
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, September 1992), Table III.F.2, n.p.
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TABLE 4
OFFSHORE PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURED EXPORTS, AND OVERSEAS
DISTRIBUTION BY US CORPORATIONS, 1990
Sales by Majority US
Subsidiaries Engaged
Principally in
Manufacturing
$96.6b
$16.5b
$339.4b
US Exports of
Manufactured Goods
$73.9b
$25.0b
$81.3b
Sales by Majority US
Subsidiaries Engaged
Principally in
Wholesaling
$18.2b
$1.7b
$1 19.9b
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates, Preliminary 1990
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, September 1990), Table III.E.3, n.p.; and International Trade
Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, USFre.ign T ade Highlights: 1991
(Washington, DC: USGPO, May 1992), Tables 10 and 11, pp. 28, 32.
Location
of Sales
Canaa
Mexico
The EC
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TABLE 5
US PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURED IMPORTS, AND US DISTRIBUTION BY FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS, 1990
National Origin of
Subsidiaries or
Source of Imports
The EC
Canada
Japan
Sales by Foreign
Subsidiaries Engaged
Principally in US
Manufacturing
$195.4b
$58.2b
$59.3b
US Imports of
Manufactured Goods
$81.2b
$69.6b
$89.1b
Sales by Foreign
Subsidiaries Engaged
Principally in US
Wholesaling
$111.5b
$28.4b
$21 9.4b
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in
the United States: Operations of US Affiliates of Foreign Companies. Preliminary 1990
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, August 1992), Table E-4, n.p.; and International Trade
Administration, Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, US Foreign Trade Highlights: 1991
(Washington, DC: USGPO, May 1992), Tables 10 and 11, pp. 28, 32.
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TABLE 6
US BILATERAL TRADE WITH AMERICA'S TOP-4 TRADING PARTNERS:
INTRACOMPANY VS. ARM'S LENGTH SHIPMENTS, 1990*
TRADE WITH CANADA ($ billion) 
US Parents
to/from
Majority US
Subsidiaries in
Canada
30.6
33.2
Canadian
Affiliates in US
to/from
Canadian
Parents
1.1
6.8
US Parents
to/from
Unaffiliated
Buyers in
Canada
14.7
11.4
Canadian
Affiliates in US
to/from
Unaffiliated
Buyers in
Canada
1
0.7
TRADE WITH MEXICO ($ billion)
US Parents
to/from
Majority US
Subsidiaries in
yaxico
7.1
7.2
Mexican
Affiliates in US
to/from
Mexican
Parents
0.1
0.6
US Parents
to/from
Unaffiliated
Buyers in
Mexico
4.7
3.6
Mexican
Affiliates in US
to/from
Unaffiliated
Buyers in
Mexico
0.1
1.6
All Other Trade
16.3
17.2
TRADE WITH
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
THE EUROPEAN
US Parents
to/from
Majority US
Subsidiaries in
26.6
11.2
COMMUNITY ($ billion)
US Parents
to/from
EC Affiliates in Unaffiliated
the US to/from Buyers in the
EC Parwi E
8.7 33.6
31.8 17.8
EC Affiliates in
the US to/from
Unaffiliated
Buyers in the
7.5
3.7
All Other Trade
21.6
31.0
TRADE WITH JAPAN ($ billion)
US Parents
to/from
Majority US
Subsidiaries in
Japan
7.1
1.3
Japanese
Affiliates in US
to/from
Japanese
Pargnts
22.5
73.2
Japanese
Affiliates in US
to/from
Unaffiliated
Buyers in
Japan
6.8
12.5
All Other Trade
12.2
2.2
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
All Other Trade
36.3
39.3
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
Direction
of Trade
US Exports
US Imports
- -
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ITABLE 6 (continued)
Notes:
*MNC-related arm's length trade estimated for 1990 using data from 1989 (for US MNCs) and
1987 (for Canadian, EC, Japanese, and Mexican MNCs).
Sources: US Commerce Department, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct Investment
Abroad: Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and their Foreign Affiliates. Preliminary 1990
Estimates (Washington: USGPO, September 1992), Table III.H.1, n.p.; and Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States: Operations of US Affiliates of Foreign Companies. Preliminary
1990 Estimates (Washington: USGPO, August 1992), Table G-2, n.p.; and U.S. Direct
Investment Abroad: 1989 Benchmark Survey. Final Results (Washington, DC: USGPO, October
1992), Tables II.Q.2 and 11.Q.5, pp. 113, 116; and Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States: 1987 Benchmark Surveyv. Final Results (Washington, DC: USGPO, August 1990),
Tables G-24, G-28, G-30, G-34, pp. 142-152; and International Trade Administration,
Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, US Foreign Trade Highlights: 1991 (Washington, DC:
USGPO, May 1992), Tables 2 and 3, pp. 11, 15.
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